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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
GIVEN ITS ROLE IN promoting and regulating civil and mil-itary aviation, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is
one of the most visible federal agencies to the general public.
To fulfill its domestic and international aviation roles, the FAA
must strike a balance between security and commercial interests
and its own budget constraints. It is also an economic and intel-
ligence target. While aviation security policy has evolved since
2001, policies designed to promote commerce and to facilitate
overseas operations and maintenance by U.S. carriers and aero-
space manufacturers have resulted in two entities that are espe-
cially vulnerable to insider activities: foreign repair stations and
aircraft trusts.
In particular, foreign repair stations and aircraft trusts pose
tempting targets for criminal and terrorist activities (and activi-
ties of foreign government agents) because they present unique
opportunities for exploitation and disruption by ill-intentioned
insiders (e.g., terrorists, criminals, moles, foreign government
agents, coerced accomplices, unwitting dupes, disgruntled em-
ployees/contractors). These entities are also vulnerable to ac-
tions of altruistic insiders (e.g., employees and contractors),
however well-meaning. A tapestry of executive orders, presiden-
tial directives, regulations, and statutes creates the fabric of the
FAA’s guidance and response to the insider threat posed by state
and non-state actors.
While the vulnerabilities of repair stations and trust arrange-
ments differ widely, the common element is the role of individu-
als who have access by virtue of their jobs. While insiders may act
for altruistic or nefarious reasons, regardless of whether they are
state or non-state actors, there are effective measures which can
be taken to counter the insider threat and improve security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of revelations about the intelligence community
by Pfc. Bradley Manning1 in WikiLeaks,2 and prior to leaks by
Edward Snowden3 to The Guardian,4 the federal government was
in the process of implementing insider threat programs. Imple-
mentation was on an agency-by-agency basis in response to Exec-
utive Order 13587 regarding Structural Reforms to Improve the
Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and
Safeguarding of Classified Information (EO 13587).5
While these well-publicized cases of insider information leaks
may have far-reaching adverse consequences for U.S. domestic
and international intelligence collection programs which are de-
pendent on information technology (IT), insider activities are
not limited to compromise, disclosure, or destruction of IT. For-
eign repair stations and aviation trusts are also susceptible to
operations, communications, and technical security threats
1 Bradley Manning is a U.S. Army soldier who was convicted in July 2013 of
violations of the Espionage Act and other offenses including copying and dissem-
inating classified military field reports, State Department cables and Guantanamo
detainee assessments after publicly disclosing the largest volume of restricted
documents in U.S. history in WikiLeaks. See Julie Tate, Bradley Manning Sentenced
to 35 Years in WikiLeaks Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.washing
tonpost.com/2013-08-21/world/41431547_1_bradley-manning-david-coombs-pre
trial-confinement [https://perma.cc/SP9S-6NUN].
2 WikiLeaks is “an international, online, non-profit organisation which pub-
lishes secret information, news leaks, and classified media from anonymous
sources.” See WikiLeaks, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiLeaks
[https://perma.cc/JZ9L-5DJC] (last visited Sept. 1, 2017).
3 Edward Snowden is a former U.S. National Security Agency contractor for-
merly employed by Booz Allen Hamilton who admitted he revealed information
concerning classified surveillance programs to media outlets including The
Guardian newspaper. See Tabassum Zakaria & Mark Hosenball, Edward Snowden
Charged with Espionage Over NSA Leaks, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2013), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/21/edward-snowden-charged_n_3480984.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/2MNU-BUWN].
4 The Guardian is a British newspaper that published the June 9, 2013, inter-
view in which Edward Snowden identified himself as the source of unauthorized
information leaks regarding U.S. national security surveillance programs. See
Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden, NSA Files Source: ‘If They Want to Get You, In Time
They Will’, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 9, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowden-why [https://perma.cc/5LZK-
RFB2]. See also Peter Finn & Sari Horowitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage,
WASH. POST (June 21, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-21/
world/40116763_1_hong-kong-nsa-justice-department [https://perma.cc/
MU7M-C9WN].
5 Exec. Order No. 13,587, 76 Fed. Reg. 63,811 (Oct. 13, 2011) [hereinafter EO
135871], http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-10-13/pdf/2011-26729.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E4AG-MAAQ].
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posed by insiders. Because of the nature of flight maintenance
operations and aircraft registry practices, foreign repair stations
and aviation trusts are vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation,
and disruption by insiders. Foreign repair stations and aviation
trusts are potential targets of security and economic disruption.
The nature of foreign repair stations and aviation trusts creates
opportunities for physical intrusion, economic disruption, and
deception by determined inside actors with the means, motive,
skills, and access to exploit them.
Although the FAA has the difficult task of ensuring aviation
safety and promoting commerce, it shares responsibility for se-
curity with other agencies. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 40101,6 the
FAA is responsible for, among other things,
(1) assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as
the highest priorities in air commerce[;] (2) regulating air com-
merce in a way that best promotes safety and fulfills national de-
fense requirements[;] (3) encouraging and developing civil
aeronautics, including new aviation technology[;] (4) controlling
the use of the navigable airspace and regulating civil and military
operations in that airspace in the interest of the safety and effi-
ciency of both of those operations[;] (5) consolidating research
and development for air navigation facilities and the installation
and operation of those facilities[;] (6) developing and operating
a common system of air traffic control and navigation for military
and civil aircraft[; and] (7) providing assistance to law enforce-
ment agencies in the enforcement of laws related to regulation
of controlled substances, to the extent consistent with aviation
safety.7
In consultation with the Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security8 (BTS) of the Department of Home-
land Security9 (DHS), the FAA is charged with ensuring “the se-
curity of maintenance and repair work conducted on air carrier
6 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012).
7 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d).
8 As a result of reorganization pursuant to DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff’s
Six-Point Agenda, the Directorate of Policy assumed policy coordination func-
tions in July 2005 previously performed by BTS. See Department Six-Point Agenda,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/department-six-point-agenda
[https://perma.cc/MFX3-K3RF]. See also Secretary Michael Chertoff U.S. Department
of Homeland Security Second Stage Review Remarks, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(July 13, 2005), http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2005/07/13/secretary-micha
el-chertoff-us-department-homeland-security-second-stage [https://perma.cc/
V26M-33PW].
9 49 U.S.C. § 44924 (2012).
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aircraft and components at foreign repair stations.”10 However,
the FAA is solely responsible for establishing and implementing
a
safety assessment system for all [part 145]11 repair stations based
on the type, scope, and complexity of work being performed . . .
[which] (1) ensure[s] that repair stations located outside the
United States are subject to appropriate inspections based on
identified risks and consistent with existing United States re-
quirements; (2) consider[s] inspection results and findings sub-
mitted by foreign civil aviation authorities operating under a
maintenance safety or maintenance implementation agreement
with the United States; and (3) require[s] all maintenance safety
or maintenance implementation agreements to provide an op-
portunity for the [FAA] to conduct independent inspections of
covered part 145 repair stations when safety concerns warrant
such inspections.12
In addition to ensuring aviation safety and security, the FAA is
also charged by Congress with promoting commerce. Certifica-
tion of foreign repair stations used by U.S. carriers and manu-
facturers arguably impacts both aviation safety and commerce.
In 2009, commercial aviation drove “$1.3 trillion in U.S. eco-
nomic activity and, . . . [supported] more than 10 million U.S.
jobs.”13 The “aviation sector is critical to our place in the global
marketplace. It contribute[d] $75 billion to [the U.S.] trade bal-
ance and represent[ed] roughly [six] percent of the gross do-
mestic product of the country.”14 In addition, “[c]ivilian aircraft
engines, equipment and parts also contribute[d] $75 billion to-
ward the U.S. trade balance [in 2009]. Civilian aircraft engines,
equipment and parts have been the top net export for the past
decade.”15 Aircraft trusts are instrumental in encouraging sales
and facilitating registration of U.S.-made aircraft, engines,
equipment, and parts. Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 47, trust struc-
tures also make it possible for foreign owners to maintain air-
craft on the U.S. registry and to U.S. aviation maintenance,
inspection, and safety standards.
10 49 U.S.C. § 44924(a).
11 14 C.F.R. § 145.205 (2016).
12 49 U.S.C. § 44733 (2012).
13 FAA MODERNIZATION AND REFORM ACT OF 2012—CONFERENCE REPORT, 2012
WL 370418, 158 Cong. Rec. S333-02 (2012) at 3.
14 Id.
15 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVIL AVIATION ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY at 3 (2011).
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II. BACKGROUND
When Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act of 195816
(the 1958 Act) creating a Federal Aviation Agency (the Agency)
with oversight and regulatory power to ensure aviation safety in
the United States, it exercised its inherent powers under Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution to regulate interstate com-
merce.17 The 1958 Act “consolidated among other things all the
essential management functions necessary to support the com-
mon needs of [U.S.] civil and military aviation.”18 To fulfill its
roles of ensuring flight safety and promoting commerce, Con-
gress statutorily authorized the Agency, and its successor, the
FAA,19 to certify foreign repair stations and to permit foreign
owners to register aircraft on the FAA Registry (the N Registry).
Today, the FAA is grappling with the challenge of ensuring avia-
tion security without stifling commerce by placing an undue
burden on commercial carriers and private aircraft owners. For-
eign repair stations and aircraft trusts present unique opportu-
nities for exploitation and infiltration by terrorists and foreign
governments to disrupt civil aviation and the U.S. economy.
Thus, how the FAA addresses insider threats to foreign repair
stations and aircraft trusts is critical to national security.
A. WHY DO FOREIGN REPAIR STATIONS EXIST?
In order to analyze foreign repair station vulnerabilities, it is
useful to first know what a foreign repair station is and why it
exists. Foreign repair stations are facilities outside of the conti-
nental United States which are authorized to perform “mainte-
nance, preventive maintenance, or alterations for an air carrier
or commercial operator” in accordance with its maintenance
16 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).





19 Congress enacted legislation in 1966 authorizing creation of the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT), then renamed the Agency the “Federal Aviation
Administration,” and finally, while expressly maintaining the FAA’s statutory in-
dependence, folded the FAA into the DOT. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-848,
104th Cong., (1996); Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-264 (1996). See also A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ [https://perma.cc/PP5X-2PFN].
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program and maintenance manual.20 The reason why they exist
is a practical one.
After World War II, the international aviation boom
prompted the United States to certify foreign repair stations in
order to ensure that U.S. carriers and operators of U.S.-regis-
tered aircraft operating overseas could obtain maintenance and
repairs.21 With U.S. carriers increasingly adding foreign-made
aircraft such as British Aerospace Jetstream turboprop aircraft as
well as engines and other aircraft components to their fleets,
[U.S.] carriers and manufacturers were regularly shipping for-
eign-built components to their original manufacturers for repair,
and U.S.-operated turboprops, . . . as well as some corporate jets,
were also being sent abroad for maintenance and alterations.
FAA had to issue exemptions to permit foreign manufacturers to
perform repairs on their own products, and to permit U.S. opera-
tors to obtain repairs abroad when they could not be performed
in the U.S. in a timely manner because of a lack of appropriately-
rated facilities.22
Prior to 1988, in order for a U.S. carrier or operator to obtain
maintenance or repairs of its foreign-made aircraft, engines, or
components, it had to request and receive an exemption from
the FAA.23 For the carrier, downtime is costly as the aircraft
would be out of service and not generating fees. Furthermore, if
an aircraft were at a repair facility waiting for an exemption
prior to making repairs, it could incur daily storage charges or
lose its slot on the scheduled maintenance facility calendar if
the wait exceeded a certain number of days. In addition, the
carrier could become subject to sales and use taxes and/or
value-added taxes depending on the time it took the FAA to pro-
cess the exemption.
By permitting foreign repair stations to obtain FAA certifica-
tion, this eliminated the need to file exemptions and ensured
foreign repair stations met substantially similar certification and
personnel requirements as those imposed on domestic repair
20 14 C.F.R. § 145.205 (2016).
21 Guy S. Gardner, Assoc. Adm’r for Regulation and Certification, FAA, State-
ment Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., Subcom-
mittee on Aviation, Concerning the Certification of Foreign Repair Stations,
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stations.24 As a result, carriers saved time and money by eliminat-
ing paperwork and associated administrative delays. Since incep-
tion, the FAA’s foreign repair station oversight has focused on
aviation safety with security being left primarily to carriers and
repair facilities.
B. WHY DO AIRCRAFT TRUSTS EXIST?
In order to analyze aircraft trust vulnerabilities, it is helpful to
know what constitutes a trust and why they are so prevalent in
aviation. Aircraft trusts are finance agreements which enable air-
craft beneficially-owned by trustees to be registered in the
United States on behalf of corporations and non-U.S. citizens.25
The purpose of an aircraft trust is to give the trustee the power
to manage and control the aircraft with respect to matters in-
volving ownership and management of the aircraft. To do so,
creating a U.S. trustee ensures the aircraft is controlled by a U.S.
citizen as statutorily required.26 The trust arrangement is de-
signed to ensure that the beneficiary has no power to influence
or control the exercise of the trustee’s authority with respect to
ownership and management matters.27 For a fee, U.S. banks will
serve as owner-trustees of trust assets. Bank-administered trust
services enable foreign owners to use “trust structures and vot-
ing trusts to secure U.S. registration of aircraft for non-U.S. citi-
zen corporations and individuals.”28 This arrangement benefits
U.S. aircraft manufacturers, their customers, and financiers. It
also advances the FAA’s statutory mandates of promoting com-
merce and safety.
At the heart of trust formation and associated FAA registra-
tion lie two statutes: 49 U.S.C. §§ 44102 and 44103. While Title
49, Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart iii, Chapter 441 governs opera-
tion, registration and recordation of aircraft ownership rights
and interests,29 49 U.S.C. §§ 44102 and 44103 prescribe the citi-
24 Id.
25 What Is an Aircraft Trust?, VAN BORTEL AIRCRAFT INC., http://vanbortel.com/
files/Basic_Trust_FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G5G-D87J]; see also 14 C.F.R.
§ 145.51(c) (2014); 49 U.S.C. § 44924 (2012).
26 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15).
27 The trustee will typically provide an affidavit to the FAA. See 14 C.F.R.
47.7(c)(2)(iii) (2016).
28 Transportation and Large Ticket Products, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wells
fargo.com/com/corporate-trust/lease [https://perma.cc/EP5S-5XTH]; see also
14 C.F.R. § 47.
29 49 U.S.C. § 44101 (2012).
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zenship, registration, and nationality requirements which con-
tribute to the widespread use of trust arrangements.
1. 49 U.S.C. § 44102
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44102,30 only aircraft which are not
on a foreign registry and which are owned by a U.S. citizen, resi-
dent alien, or corporation31 may be registered on the N Registry.
While U.S. citizens and resident aliens may base and operate
their aircraft outside of the United States, all corporate-owned
aircraft must be based and primarily used in the United States,
and the corporations must be organized and doing business
under U.S. or state laws.32
2. 49 U.S.C. § 44103
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44103,33 the registration certificate of
a § 44102-qualified aircraft is “(1) conclusive evidence of the na-
tionality of an aircraft for international purposes, but not con-
clusive evidence in a proceeding under the laws of the United
States; and (2) not evidence of ownership of an aircraft in a pro-
ceeding in which ownership is or may be in issue.”34 So long as a
U.S. citizen, resident alien, or corporation is the registered
owner of the aircraft, and assuming the aircraft is airworthy, it
may operate in U.S. airspace and be maintained on the U.S. N
Registry.
The presumption of U.S. nationality of corporate owner-regis-
trants is what makes §§ 44102 and 44103 work in favor of aircraft
manufacturers and foreign purchasers of aircraft, while also pro-
moting aviation safety and generating tax revenues for state and
federal tax authorities. These two provisions have also contrib-
uted to the widespread use of aircraft trusts.
III. WHAT IS THE INSIDER THREAT?
In order to address the insider threat, it is helpful to define
the terms “insider” and “insider threat.” A working definition of
an “insider” is an employee (or contractor) “who may represent
30 49 U.S.C. § 44102 (2012); 14 C.F.R. §§ 45, 47, 49 (2016).
31 49 U.S.C. § 44102(a)(1)(C).
32 Id.
33 49 U.S.C. § 44103 (2012); 14 C.F.R. §§ 45, 47, 49 (2016).
34 49 U.S.C. § 44103(c).
528 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
a threat to national security.”35 The National Insider Threat Pol-
icy (NITP)36 broadly defines the term “insider” as “[a]ny person
with authorized access to any United States Government re-
source to include personnel, facilities, information, equipment,
networks, or systems.”37 In addition, a “malicious insider [is
someone who] can deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, deceive, cor-
rupt, [and/or] usurp”38 legitimate goals, activities, and/or
actors.
While the insider threat includes “fraud, theft of intellectual
property (e.g., trade secrets, strategic plans, and other confiden-
tial information), [IT] sabotage, and espionage,”39 the term it-
self encompasses multiple security concepts. The NITP broadly
defines the term “insider threat” as
[t]he threat that an insider will use her/his authorized access,
wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United
States. This threat can include damage to the United States
through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of na-
tional security information, or through the loss or degradation of
departmental resources or capabilities.40
The critical element which makes the insider threat so insidious
is trust. The insider takes advantage of his status as a trusted
insider to gain access to information, facilities, and/or resources
from which outsiders would normally be barred absent a court
order.
Contrary to its name, the NITP is not a single policy. It is an
aggregation of several executive orders which “leverages existing
federal laws, statutes, authorities, policies, programs, systems, ar-
chitectures and resources in order to counter the threat of those
insiders who may use their authorized access to compromise
35 A Preliminary Examination of Insider Threat Programs in the U.S. Private Sector,
INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. ALL., Sept. 2013, at 3, http://csrc.nist.gov/cyber
framework/framework_comments/20131213_charles_alsup_insa_part4.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/YR9N-SVNM] [hereinafter A Preliminary Examination of Insider
Threat Programs].
36 National Insider Threat Policy (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/in-
sider.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9DZ-YRED]; see also Presidential Memorandum—Na-
tional Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat
Programs, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/11/21/presidential-memorandum-national-insider-threat-policy-and
-minimum-stand [https://perma.cc/H5MU-RBPA].
37 National Insider Threat Policy, supra note 36, at 4.
38 A Preliminary Examination of Insider Threat Programs, supra note 35, at 3.
39 Id. at 1.
40 National Insider Threat Policy, supra note 36, at 4.
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classified information.”41 Apart from EO 13587, the NITP relies
on EO 1352642 and EO 1296843 to protect classified national se-
curity information by establishing access criteria, which also in-
clude “appropriate protections for privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties.”44
The role of insiders and the threat posed by them is “the top
counterintelligence challenge to [the intelligence] commu-
nity”45 and, arguably, national security. The potential scope of
insider activities is limited only by human imagination. Histori-
cally, insiders are nothing new. Whether rogue stockbrokers46 or
Cold War-era moles,47 insiders have caused organizations “finan-
cial losses, negative impacts to business operations, and damage
to reputation.”48 Whether rising to the level of treason perpe-
trated by Benedict Arnold49 or Robert Hanssen,50 it is likely in-
41 Id. at 1.
42 Executive Order 13526 provides a “uniform system for classifying, safeguard-
ing, and declassifying national security information, including information relat-
ing to defense against transnational terrorism” which includes classification
authorities, standards, levels, categories, and duration. Exec. Order No. 13,526,
75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
43 Executive Order 12968, as amended by EO 13467, provides access, disclo-
sure, eligibility, and administrative proceedings guidelines for classified informa-
tion. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 (Aug. 7, 1995), http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1995-08-07/pdf/95-19654.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RMW-
V3Y6]; see also Exec. Order No. 13,467, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,103 (July 2, 2008), http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-07-02/pdf/08-1409.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DM7G-VWRV].
44 National Insider Threat Policy, supra note 36, at 1.
45 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE, 46 n.5 (2012), https://intelligence.house.gov/
sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative%20re
port%20(final).pdf [https://perma.cc/JC7M-LW2B]; see also Aquala Bogan, Dave
DeVries on the DoD’s Mobile Device Strategy: IT Priorities and Big Data Analytics, WASH.
EXEC. (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonexec.com/2013/03/dave-devries-
on-the-dods-mobile-device-strategy-and-it-priorities/ [https://perma.cc/9GLA-
XNBN].
46 Four Canadians Charged in Largest International Penny Stock Fraud Scheme in His-
tory, FIN. POST (Aug. 13, 2013), http://business.financialpost.com/2013/08/13/
four-canadians-charged-in-largest-international-penny-stock-fraud-scheme-in-his
tory/ [https://perma.cc/7S57-TYMS].
47 Robert Hanssen, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 20, 2001) https://www.
fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/robert-hanssen [https://perma.cc/5TJ7-Q654].
48 Information Security Risk Assessment Applicability and Impact to the FAA Safety
Management System, RAYTHEON COMPANY (Apr. 30, 2012) at 10 [hereinafter ISR—
FAA Safety Management System].
49 Benedict Arnold, US HISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/ValleyForge/served/
arnold.html [https://perma.cc/N9MQ-9YAH].
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sider leaks have occasioned the detention, arrest, interrogation,
torture, and/or death of U.S. intelligence sources and
operatives.51
Depending on an insider’s access level and funding, as well as
the complexity and scope of his operational plan and goals, an
insider’s activities can “take as long as external threats to exe-
cute, [while] well planned attacks can take weeks and months to
prepare; ultimately the magnitude of either can be signifi-
cant.”52 Although
insiders pose a substantial threat by virtue of their knowledge of,
and access to, employer systems and/or databases, . . . external
threats are nearly surpassing the internal concerns; it will be in
the near term that both internal and external threats have to be
dealt with at the same levels. The methods and motivation of
each may be different; however the results are nearly the same
and as such must be treated at the medium to high risk levels.53
As significant and potentially dangerous as the actions of an
insider may be, any program which is designed to counter in-
sider threats has the potential for overzealous implementation
and missteps. The insider threat program the FAA is implement-
ing is no exception; however, how the FAA addresses insider
threats is important given the FAA’s public trust and visibility.
Since 1958, the FAA has functioned as a primarily civilian and
essentially global public entity which has twenty-four-hour do-
mestic and international operations.54 The FAA also plays a role
in military aviation55 as well as a global role in promoting avia-
tion safety and aviation-related intelligence.56 It is thus a civil,
military, and intelligence target.
Since 2001, the FAA has had the unenviable task of striking a
balance between aviation safety and security measures and costs
50 See Robert Hanssen, supra note 47.
51 Brian Palmer, Has an Intelligence Leak Ever Caused an American Death?, SLATE
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/
2012/09/navy_seal_matt_bissonnette_s_no_easy_day_has_an_intelligence_leak_
ever_cost_an_american_life_.html [https://perma.cc/7U42-5FPT].
52 ISR—FAA Safety Management System, supra note 48, at 10.
53 Id. at 9.
54 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 19.
55 Special Operations, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/
publications/spec_ops/ [https://perma.cc/F6NV-8592].
56 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012); Notice Re: Coordination with the Office of Security and
Hazardous Materials Safety on Aviation Safety, Security, Intelligence, and Support to Law
Enforcement, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (July 2, 2013), http://www.faa.gov/document
Library/media/Notice/N_8900.222.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDA2-HRYE].
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to commercial interests while operating within DOT budget
constraints.
Before September 11th, the aviation security model was mostly
based on reacting to known security threats instead of being
proactive against potential threats. The model, dating back to the
early 1970s, was implemented through a system of shared respon-
sibilities. Industry provided and paid for the security; FAA’s role
was to establish security requirements and ensure compliance
with these requirements. Within the model were counter pres-
sures to control security costs and limit the impact of security on
aviation operations, so that industry could concentrate on its pri-
mary mission of moving passengers seamlessly and safely through
the system.57
Today, financial decisions and competing priorities impact
not only the cyber-vulnerabilities of NextGen,58 but also security-
related issues posed by foreign repair stations and aviation
trusts. Widespread availability and use of computers, IT, and the
internet make it possible to intrude electronically from virtually
anywhere in the world. For example, “the FAA’s systems are
probed 50,000 times an hour by people intent on doing harm at
some point.”59 Weighed against the cyber threat, and the fund-
ing granted by Congress to combat it, it is tempting to give
human insider threats short shrift.
Faced with the evolving nature of the insider threat, the FAA
is at a crossroads. It must balance national aviation security pol-
icy requirements with its statutory mandate to promote com-
merce and the historic openness of the aviation community.
Further complicating this task is the emphasis placed on data
security and “cyber” at the expense of overlooking other impor-
tant areas which are vulnerable to penetration, exploitation, ma-
nipulation, and disruption. The relative ease with which an
insider could potentially endanger the safety of passengers and
aircrew as well as adversely impact the global economy by target-
57 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Statement Before the National Commission on Ter-
rorist Attacks Upon the United States on Aviation Security, at 1 (May 22, 2003),
https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/cc2003117.pdf [hereinafter DOT IG
Statement] [https://perma.cc/T4ZS-7H99].
58 NextGen is the FAA’s satellite-based navigation system. See What is
NextGen?, Fed. Aviation Admin. (2013), https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/ [https:/
/perma.cc/AWU8-UXE5].
59 James Careless, Moving Targets, AIR TRAFFIC MGMT. (Mar. 3, 2015), http://
www.airtrafficmanagement.net/2015/03/moving-targets/ [https://perma.cc/
QYP8-HHLT] (statement by FAA Administrator Michael Huerta).
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ing foreign repair stations and/or aviation trusts is particularly
problematic.
IV. AVIATION SECURITY POLICY
To combat the evolving insider threat, U.S. aviation security
policy is changing. The policy framework shaping the FAA’s ap-
proach consists of executive orders, legislation, and directives
(collectively, Policies). The most important Policies applied to
the question of how to detect and deter insider threats to for-
eign repair stations and aviation trusts are EO 13587,60 EO
13388,61 the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004, as amended (IRTPA),62 National Security Policy Direc-
tive 47/Homeland Security Policy Directive 16 (NSPD 47/HSPD
16),63 and National Security Directive 42 (NSD 42).64 In addi-
tion to these Policies, the Executive Agent for Safeguarding
Classified Information on Computer Networks (EACICN)65 and
the Insider Threat Task Force (ITTF)66 established by EO 13587
also play key roles.
A. EO 13587
When President Barack Obama enacted EO 13587, he placed
the burden on federal agencies to implement structural reforms
“to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified in-
formation on computer networks.”67 He also required them to
provide
appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties . . . [by
adopting] minimum standards regarding information security,
personnel security, and systems security; [to] address both inter-
nal and external security threats and vulnerabilities; and [to]
60 EO 13587, supra note 5.
61 Exec. Order No. 13,388, 70 Fed. Reg. 62,023 (Oct. 25, 2005) [hereinafter
EO 13388].
62 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended,
Pub. L. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ
458/html/PLAW-108publ458.htm [https://perma.cc/3ZWE-VWFY] [hereinafter
IRTPA].
63 National Security Policy Directive 47/ Homeland Security Policy Directive
16, WHITE HOUSE (June 20, 2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-
47.pdf [https://perma.cc/82J6-5VE6].
64 National Security Directive 42, WHITE HOUSE (July 5, 1990), http://www.
fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd42.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND8P-KH3Q].
65 EO 13587, supra note 5, § 5.
66 Id. § 6.
67 Id.
2017] THE INSIDER THREAT 533
provide policies and minimum standards for sharing classified in-
formation both within and outside the Federal Government.68
Although designed specifically to address computer security vul-
nerabilities, EO 13587 applies to “all users of classified com-
puter networks . . . and all classified information on those
networks.”69
Whether information is classified “Top Secret” or is sensitive
but unclassified, that designation is made in accordance with
EO 13256.70 Regardless of whether the classification authority is
the Department of Defense71 or the FAA, the classification
marked on a document is designed to limit access and protect
against unauthorized disclosure depending on its sensitivity.72
Given the breadth of EO 13587, anyone who uses the FAA com-
puter network, including anyone who accesses FAA-maintained
databases, may potentially face prosecution. This potential liabil-
ity exists because of EO 13587’s
policies and minimum standards for sharing classified informa-
tion both within and outside the Federal Government. . . .
[which] address all agencies that operate or access classified
computer networks, all users of classified computer networks (in-
cluding contractors and others who operate or access classified
computer networks controlled by the Federal Government), and
all classified information on those networks.73
To balance the risk of prosecution and termination of federal
employment with the U.S. Constitution, EO 13587 provides for
68 Id.
69 Id. (emphasis added).
70 On December 29, 2009, President Barack Obama revoked E.O. 12958. Kevin
R. Kosar, Security Classification Policy and Procedure: E.O. 12958, as Amended, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. at 11 (Dec. 31, 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/97-
771.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3DD-44LJ]. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed.
Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009), https://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/cnsi-
eo.html [https://perma.cc/M4ZY-69HM]; see also Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60
Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995), https://fas.org/sgp/clinton/eo12958.html
[https://perma.cc/5BWS-K789], amended by Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed.
Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003), http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/
eo-12958-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/M33Q-2W2E].
71 DoD Guide to Marking Classified Documents, OFFICE OF THE ASSIST. SEC. OF DEF.
FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMC’N, AND INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 28, 1997), http://
www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Administration_and_Management/907.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JR3Q-Z47P].
72 Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (SF312) and Verbal Attestation
Briefing Pamphlet, DEP’T OF DEF. at 5 (May 2000), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw
/dodd/corres/pdf/52001ph1_0500/p5200ph1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SPQ5-UE
63].
73 EO 13587, supra note 5, § 1.
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whistleblower protection74 as well as privacy and civil liberties
safeguards75 by extending the legal protections of the “Intelli-
gence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998,
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Inspector General Act of
1978, or similar statutes, regulations, or policies”76 to govern-
ment employees and contractors.
Although EO 13587 applies to publicly available information
such as aircraft registration numbers and information published
on the FAA Registry,77 that information is maintained in the reg-
istry database and/or in internal FAA databases. Thus, insiders
who use or access this information may face prosecution if their
disclosures are unauthorized. Such insiders may also potentially
avail themselves of EO 13587’s whistleblower protections. For
example, if an FAA contractor (or an FAA employee) at a for-
eign repair station were to use sensitive but unclassified informa-
tion accessible to him through an FAA database or the FAA
website in the course of performing his work-related duties, he
could potentially seek whistleblower status if he claimed his
leaks, whether to the media or published on a blog, were to ex-
pose fraud, waste, or abuse.
It is also possible that an FAA contractor (or an FAA em-
ployee) could use sensitive but unclassified information for
harmful purposes (e.g., disrupting air traffic, causing panic in
the flying public, or wreaking economic havoc). As EO 13587
contains anti-retaliation provisions, which prohibit agencies
from seeking to “deter, detect, or mitigate disclosures of infor-
mation,”78 it is possible an insider could attempt to evade ad-
verse administrative action or criminal prosecution by claiming
whistleblower status.
1. EACICN
Prior to enactment of EO 13587, the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) were desig-
nated by NSD 42 as the Executive Agent and National Manager
for national security systems respectively. Their separate roles
were merged pursuant to EO 13587 into a joint EACICN.79 The
74 Id. § 7(e).
75 Id. § 7(h).
76 Id. § 7(e).
77 See FAA Registry, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftin
quiry/ [https://perma.cc/T73D-HEP5].
78 EO 13587, supra note 5, § 7(e).
79 Id. § 5.1.
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goal of linking separate military and intelligence roles and func-
tions was to promote information sharing, particularly of classi-
fied information on computer networks.80 The EACICN was also
directed to ensure “reliable implementation of policies and min-
imum standards regarding information security, personnel se-
curity, and systems security; address both internal and external
security threats and vulnerabilities; and provide policies and
minimum standards for sharing classified information both
within and outside the Federal Government.”81 EO 13587 is im-
portant because it openly recognized the insider threat govern-
ment-wide. Although the requirement to ensure personnel
security and address the internal threat is tied to computer se-
curity and information security, these issues directly impact not
only airspace management but aircraft maintenance and
registration.
2. ITTF
Given the mounting importance of insider threat detection
and prevention, EO 13587 also established the Insider Threat
Task Force to provide overall guidance and standards devised by
the Attorney General (AG) and the Director of National Intelli-
gence (DNI), or their designees.82 Curiously, unlike NSD 42,
which provided for DOT (and implicitly FAA) to be involved
with efforts to combat the insider threat, the ITTF does not ex-
plicitly include DOT or FAA.83 Apart from certain enumerated
agencies, ITTF membership is limited to only “such additional
agencies as [the AG and DNI] may designate”84 jointly. ITTF
staff is drawn from the FBI and the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, “and other agencies, as deter-
mined by the co-chairs for their respective agencies and to the
extent permitted by law.”85 Given the nature of the September
11th attacks and the vulnerability of aviation to attack, sabotage,
infiltration, and exploitation, it seems odd that the FAA is not a
named member of the ITTF. As the FAA is recognized globally
for its aviation expertise and is statutorily responsible for avia-
tion safety (and implicitly security), the omission is glaring. As
the flying public was (and will continue to be) targeted by ter-
80 Id. § 1.
81 Id.
82 Id. § 6.
83 Id. § 6.2.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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rorists for the foreseeable future, the FAA should be a perma-
nent agency member of the ITTF.
B. EO 13388
While EO 13587 is one of the most significant policies which
addresses the insider threat because it established the EACICN
and the ITTF, promoted intelligence information sharing, and
extended whistleblower protection to government employees
and contractors, it is not the sole relevant authority. EO 13388 is
equally important because it was designed to “strengthen the ef-
fective conduct of [U.S.] counterterrorism activities and protect
. . . [U.S.] territory, people, and interests” by giving the highest
priority to “the detection, prevention, disruption, preemption,
and mitigation of the effects of terrorist activities.”86 Just as EO
13587 has countervailing whistleblower protection provisions,
EO 13388 requires agencies to “protect the freedom, informa-
tion privacy, and other legal rights of Americans in the conduct
of [counter-terrorism] activities” while simultaneously promot-
ing the “interchange of terrorism information between agencies
and . . . appropriate private sector entities.”87
Although EO 13388 does not specifically identify what compa-
nies qualify as “appropriate private sector entities,” presumably
U.S. carriers which utilize foreign repair stations to “conduct a
range of repairs and maintenance, from critical components—
such as landing gear and engine overhauls—to heavy airframe
maintenance checks, which are a complete teardown and over-
haul of the aircraft”88 would be among those entities. The FAA
established the Quarterly Utilization Report system in 200789 to
ensure carriers and repair stations reported outsourced repairs;
however, reporting volume and locations of critical repairs is
voluntary and not subject to FAA inspection.90 Further compli-
cating matters, many foreign repair stations which are used to
86 EO 13388, supra note 61, § 1(a).
87 Id.
88 Is The Flying Public Protected? An Assessment of Security at Foreign Repair Stations:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. & Infrastructure Prot., 111th Cong. 111-
44 (2009) (statement of the Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Transp.) [hereinafter 2009 DOT IG Testimony].
89 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., THE ENHANCED REPAIR STATION AND AIR CARRIER
OVERSIGHT SYSTEM (2005); see also Dan Bachelder, Oversight of Contract Mainte-
nance, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (June 5, 2008), www.ifairworthy.com/ppt/Contract
_Maintenance.ppt? [https://perma.cc/H8AU-G4FU].
90 2009 DOT IG Testimony, supra note 88, at 4.
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perform repairs are not FAA-certified facilities owned or oper-
ated by U.S. carriers.91
Even if the facilities were carrier-owned and operated as well
as FAA-certified, the employees at foreign repair stations are
largely foreign nationals. This creates issues not only as to over-
sight, but also information sharing as an insider, due to the na-
ture of employees’ regular work duties, might have access to
threat information as well as sensitive but unclassified informa-
tion provided to the carrier. Alternately, concerns about insider
leaks or lack of cleared individuals at foreign repair stations
could also preclude or severely limit information sharing by FAA
or TSA.
Either scenario poses problems. While it may be comforting
to think of terrorists (and other non-state actors) as uneducated
or low-skill individuals, terrorists (or their dupes and accom-
plices, whether paid or coerced) could be highly skilled special-
ists and technicians (e.g., pilots,92 mechanics, computer
programmers, bankers, etc.). In particular, narco-terrorists93
may have significant resources as well as the means to pursue
longer-term and more complex plans.94 Given the sophistication
and longevity of the non-state enterprise, it may also act in ways
and have resources comparable to that of a state actor. Nonethe-
less, it is state actors (including state sponsors of terrorism),
which have historically possessed the depth of resources to pur-
sue long-term, complex, and subtle plans through their insider
agents.
91 In 2009, there were 731 foreign repair stations and 4,126 U.S. repair sta-
tions. See id. at 1.
92 While not proven, it is possible the EgyptAir Flight 990 first relief pilot may
have disconnected the autopilot in order to crash the jet as an elaborate trial run
for the attacks on the World Trade Centers to demonstrate the ease of seizing
and crashing an aircraft, assess how effectively the news would be disseminated,
and/or how law enforcement and intelligence would react to a terrorist act
originating on a flight from the United States. See Michael Ellison, US and Egypt
Split on Fatal Plane Crash, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2000), http://www.theguardi
an.com/world/2000/jun/09/egyptaircrash.usa [https://perma.cc/WAJ9-KJ4E];
see also Aircraft Accident Brief, EgyptAir Flight 990, Boeing 767-366ER, SU-GAP, 60
Miles South of Nantucket, Massachusetts, October 31, 1999, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD.,
at 4 (Mar. 13, 2002), http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft
-accident-briefs/AAB02-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/F59K-QPZD].
93 Lessons From History: Some Background Information on Narco-Funded Terrorism,
NARCOTERROR, http://www.narcoterror.org/background.htm [https://perma.
cc/Z6SR-Y7Q9].
94 John E. Thomas, Jr., Narco-Terrorism: Could the Legislative and Prosecutorial Re-
sponses Threaten Our Civil Liberties?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1881, 1882 (2009).
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For example, if a facility in Mexico performs avionics control
systems overhauls on an American Airlines Boeing 737-400 air-
craft, it is possible that a terrorist operative could pressure a
mechanic or manager at that facility to provide information
about the aircraft’s avionics systems. It is also possible a terrorist
could work at the facility and have access to the information and
aircraft in the ordinary course of his duties. This information
could be used to introduce a virus into the inertial navigation
system or flight control system of the target 737-400 operating
out of New York. Alternatively, a mechanic could sabotage flight
control wiring by stripping it of insulation or fraying it, causing
it to spark or break in-flight. In either scenario, it is possible that
the aircraft could go into an uncontrolled dive over the Atlantic
Ocean and crash. The target need not be a particular passenger
if disruption, economic dislocation, and engendering fear are
the desired outcome.
If the FAA did not know that the facility was used for such
repairs or did not have inspection or certification rights for the
facility, it would not be able to enforce adherence to U.S. airwor-
thiness and safety standards, much less deter hostile insider ac-
tivities. Even if it were an FAA-certified facility used by American
Airlines, the repair station is a Mexican company, located in
Mexico, and staffed with Mexican nationals. The Mexican gov-
ernment would need to authorize and assist in performing back-
ground checks, security and information exchanges, etc.
Furthermore, the legal safeguards of EO 13388 are not available
to Mexicans and other third-country nationals.
C. IRTPA
In addition to EO 13587 and EO 13388, IRTPA was designed
to “reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. government, and for
other purposes.”95 However, Title IV, Subtitle B—Aviation Se-
curity does not address foreign repair stations or aircraft trusts.
It is focused on airport-centric measures such as cargo, airport
screening, and flight-deck access. To address the issue of foreign
repair stations and other aviation issues, Congress enacted Vi-
sion 100,96 which required the TSA to issue repair station secur-
95 IRTPA, supra note 62, at Preamble.
96 Vision 100 is the enabling legislation for FAA’s Next Generation Air Trans-
portation System. See Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 108-76 (2003) [hereinafter Vision 100].
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ity rules for domestic and international facilities by August 2004.
Despite the Congressional mandate, the TSA did not do so. To
force the TSA to act, Congress subsequently issued the Imple-
menting Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007,97 which established an August 3, 2008,98 deadline for the
TSA to issue the required repair station security rules. Despite
Congress statutorily extending the deadline, the TSA again
failed to comply. Because of the TSA’s unwillingness or inability
to finalize repair station security rules, the FAA has been barred
from issuing new foreign repair station certifications since
2008.99 As no new domestic or foreign repair stations have been
authorized, and the required security rules have not been is-
sued, repair station vulnerabilities remain unresolved.
D. NSPD 47/HSPD 16
In order to implement a comprehensive and cohesive na-
tional aviation security policy which “optimize[d] the coordina-
tion and integration of government-wide aviation security
efforts,”100 President George W. Bush issued a new national avia-
tion security policy, NSPD 47/HSPD 16.101 NSPD 47/HSPD 16
outlines “U.S. policy, guidelines, and implementation actions to
continue the enhancement of U.S. homeland security and na-
tional security by protecting the United States and U.S. interests
from threats in the Air Domain”102 on an agency-by-agency basis
with particular emphasis on joint operations and integrated
planning. In addition, NSPD 47/HSPD 16 generated six operat-
ing plans which provide implementation guidance concerning
aviation transportation system security,103 aviation operational
97 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub.
L. 110-53 (Aug. 3, 2007).
98 Id. § 1616(a), 49 U.S.C. § 44924 (2012).
99 Irked by the Foreign Repair Station Ban?, AERONAUTICAL REPAIR STATION ASSOC.
(July 30, 2013), http://arsa.org/irked-by-the-foreign-repair-station-ban/.
100 National Security Presidential Directive 47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive
16, WHITE HOUSE http://www.dhs.gov/hspd-16-aviation-security-policy [https://
perma.cc/B6S5-P53V].
101 National Security Policy Directive 47/Homeland Security Policy Directive 16, supra
note 63.
102 DOMESTIC OUTREACH PLAN: SUPPORTING PLAN TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR AVIATION SECURITY 2, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 26, 2007), http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hspd16_domoutreachplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S38A-XVQV].
103 AVIATION TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN: SUPPORTING PLAN TO THE
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR AVIATION SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar.
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threat response,104 aviation transportation system recovery,105 air
domain surveillance and intelligence integration,106 domestic
outreach,107 and international outreach.108 While the plans pro-
vide guidance on a variety of threats and implementation of
countermeasures focused on airports, cargo, and air traffic con-
trol, they do not address repair stations and aviation trusts.
E. HSPD 7
Pursuant to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive on
Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protec-
tion (HSPD 7),109 DHS is responsible for coordinating critical
infrastructure protection activities for aviation;110 however, DOT
is responsible for operating the national air space system as ad-
ministered by the FAA.111 While DHS is tasked with “work[ing]
closely with other Federal departments and agencies, State and
local governments, and the private sector,”112 it must “collabo-
rate [with DOT] on all matters relating to transportation secur-
ity and transportation infrastructure protection.”113 As DOT “is
responsible for ensuring that air traffic control facilities, systems,
and operations are protected from significant disruption caused
26, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hspd16_transsystemsecurityplan.
pdf [https://perma.cc/P3KQ-SYKY].
104 AVIATION OPERATIONAL THREAT RESPONSE PLAN: SUPPORTING PLAN TO THE
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR AVIATION SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar.
26, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hspd16_opthreatrespplan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DT6U-UTBN].
105 AVIATION TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN, supra note 103.
106 AIR DOMAIN SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION PLAN: SUPPORT-
ING PLAN TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR AVIATION SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 26, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hspd16_
domsurvintelplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DKD-EXLJ].
107 DOMESTIC OUTREACH PLAN: SUPPORTING PLAN TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR AVIATION SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 26, 2007), http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hspd16_domoutreachplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PPY5-HGMF].
108 INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH PLAN: SUPPORTING PLAN TO THE NATIONAL STRAT-
EGY FOR AVIATION SECURITY, U.S. DEPT’ OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 26, 2007), http:/
/www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hspd16_intloutreachplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VB87-7PHM].
109 Directive on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,
WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 17, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/fy04/m-04-15.pdf [hereinafter HSPD 7] [https://perma.cc/
VT67-S7CY].
110 Id. § 15.
111 Id. § 22(h).
112 Id. § 17.
113 Id. § 22(h).
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by man-made or natural events[, it must be] able to resume es-
sential services in a timely manner if disrupted, to minimize the
impact on the Nation’s economy.”114 While DOT has “its own
unique characteristics and operating models”115 which do not
necessarily mesh well with DHS culture, it must coordinate and
cooperate with DHS to fulfill the requirements of HSPD 7.116
Therein lies the problem. Transportation, particularly aviation,
has its own vernacular, customs, and culture. Foreign repair sta-
tions and aviation trusts are two manifestations of aviation ap-
proaches to practical issues of operational efficiency and
finance.
F. NSD 42
When President George H.W. Bush enacted NSD 42117 prior
to the Gulf War,118 the potential for foreign intelligence disrup-
tion of telecommunications and information technology was
emerging as a new global threat in the post-Cold War era where
countermeasures and counterintelligence were focused on
evolving intelligence threats to U.S. programs, personnel, opera-
tions, and installations.119 NSD 42 established a 22-member
steering committee chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) and
placed the Secretary of Transportation as one of the civil agency
members. DOT was included presumably to ensure that avia-
tion, rail, automotive, and maritime risks were addressed with
respect to countering intelligence threats. NSD 42 marks the
shift to technology and telecommunications threats and away
114 Rebecca C. Leng, Memorandum re: Report on Review of FAA’s Progress in En-
hancing Air Traffic Control Systems Security Report Number FI-2010-006, DEP’T OF
TRANSP. (Nov. 2, 2009).
115 HSPD 7, supra note 109, § 18.
116 Joshua B. Bolten, Memorandum Re: Development of Homeland Security Presiden-
tial Directive (HSPD)—7 Critical Infrastructure Protection Plans to Protect Federal Critical
Infrastructures and Key Resources, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OFF. OF MGMT. AND
BUDGET (June 17, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
memoranda/fy04/m-04-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/67X5-CT92].
117 National Security Directive 42, supra note 64.
118 The first Gulf War started August 2, 1990, with the invasion of Kuwait by
Iraq and ended February 28, 1991, with Iraq’s acceptance of cease fire resolutions
issued by United Nations. Timeline: War in the Gulf, BBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2000),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/861164.stm [https://perma.cc/BNJ2-
MKHU].
119 National Security Directive 47, Counterintelligence and Security Counter-
measures, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 5, 1990), available at http://bush41library.
tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd47.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JS9-NZPX].
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from human threats and intelligence activities at a time when
internal threats were evolving and, thanks to technology, becom-
ing more likely and more widespread.
V. FOREIGN REPAIR STATIONS
Given the enormous importance of civil aviation to U.S. com-
merce, and the narrow profit margins of U.S. carriers,120 foreign
repair stations are an operational necessity. While minimizing
downtime for maintenance and returning aircraft to service
sooner is essential for efficient carrier operations, flight safety is
the FAA’s top priority. As FAA certification necessitates U.S. avi-
ation maintenance safety standards be met, FAA-certified repair
stations promote aviation safety and ensure American airworthi-
ness standards are used globally.
A. 14 CFR PART 145
Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. Part 145, Chapter 11,121 the FAA can
certify foreign repair stations which provide “documentation
demonstrating that the repair station certificate or rating is nec-
essary for maintaining U.S.-registered or U.S.-operated foreign
aircraft or components.”122 The emphasis is on flight safety and
airworthiness, not repair station security.
B. THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
To achieve Part 145 certification, the repair station must com-
plete the pre-application, formal application, document compli-
ance, demonstration and inspection, and certification
process.123 This process is focused on aviation safety, not avia-
tion security.124 The pre-application consists of a familiarization
meeting with the FAA certification team regarding the appli-
120 Airline Profitability Prospects Improve but Profit Margins Remain Anaemic, CAPA
– CENTRE FOR AVIATION (Oct. 18, 2012), http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/
airline-profitability-prospects-improve-but-profit-margins-remain-anaemic-85722
[https://perma.cc/28QY-X2MY].
121 Order 8900.1 CHG 87, § 2-1243, Fed. Aviation Admin. (Mar. 8, 2010)
[hereinafter 8900.1].
122 Id. § 2-1244.
123 Id.
124 Doug Dalbey, Deputy Director of Flight Standards for Field Operations,
Fed. Aviation Admin., Statement on Security at Foreign Repair Stations before
the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security and Infrastructure Protection 16 (Nov. 18, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 For-
eign Repair Station Update], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg
55248/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg55248.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQY3-MZME].
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cant’s intent, the application process, statutory fee,125 and sub-
mission of FAA Form 8400-6.126 As part of the formal
application, the applicant must “provide the FAA with documen-
tation demonstrating that the repair station certificate or rating
is necessary for maintaining U.S.-registered or U.S.-operated for-
eign aircraft or components as required by Part 145,
§ 145.51(c).”127 During this phase, FAA inspectors meet with the
applicant’s management team to determine the “legal name of
the owner and the address where the repair station will be lo-
cated.”128 In the document compliance phase, the FAA inspec-
tion team reviews repair station manuals “and related
attachments to ensure conformity to the applicable regulations
and safe operating practices” before it determines whether the
applicant’s procedures, facilities, and equipment meet FAA
safety requirements or require demonstration and inspection
prior to certification.129
C. VULNERABILITIES
Similar to the FAA’s focus on foreign repair station oversight,
the 2003 Inspector General report regarding aircraft repair sta-
tions focused on safety, not security.130 While it is important that
the FAA “made a number of changes to [its] oversight of repair
stations,”131 what the FAA did not do, and arguably could not
do, was improve security to safeguard against insider threats.
In part, the FAA’s inability to adequately address insider
threats is due to lack of funding and lack of statutory authority.
Under Vision 100, the FAA remains statutorily focused primarily
125 14 C.F.R. § 187.1 (2017).




130 Alexis M. Stefani, Review of Air Carriers’ Use of Aircraft Repair Stations, DEP’T
OF TRANSP., AV-2003-047, 1 (July 8, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 DOT IG Report].
131 The changes included revising the regulations that apply to repair stations;
improving quality control requirements; utilizing system safety requirements, risk
management software, and risk assessments in repair station oversight; sharing
information with air carriers; and upgrading training requirements for certain
repair station personnel. See Margaret Gilligan, Deputy Assoc. Adm’r for Aviation
Safety, Statement Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
Subcommittee on Aviation on the Federal Aviation Administration’s Oversight of Foreign
Aviation Repair Stations (June 20, 2007), https://www.transportation.gov/content
/federal-aviation-administrations-oversight-foreign-aviation-repair-stations [https:
//perma.cc/YRU5-VXYB].
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on safety while the TSA is tasked with security.132 By bifurcating
safety and security between two agencies with different organiza-
tional structures, missions, and cultures, repair station oversight
has been left at a standstill with the FAA being unable to certify
new repair stations or impose new security measures due to the
TSA’s nearly decade-long failure to comply with Congressional
instruction to issue the necessary security regulations.
Although the FAA implemented procedures in 2008 and 2009
to improve information sharing, modify inspection documenta-
tion requirements with foreign aviation authorities, develop a
process to capture results from foreign aviation authority inspec-
tions and FAA inspections, and modify procedures for con-
ducting sample inspections,133 it is difficult to see how the FAA
can effectively carry out its safety mandate and effectively inspect
repair facilities without action by the TSA.
In addition, the cooperation of foreign aviation authorities
and air carriers is also critical. In 2003, for example, French,
German, and Irish aviation authorities monitored 138 FAA-certi-
fied repair stations while FAA inspectors provided oversight for
512 FAA-certified foreign repair stations.134 In 2011, the focus of
FAA and European oversight of repair stations remained on en-
suring cooperation on aviation safety.135 However, oversight also
needs to address insider threats by integrating security as a com-
ponent of safety. The problem is how to do it cost-effectively
without crippling the U.S. aviation industry while simultaneously
obtaining global participation of and enforcement by foreign
sovereigns.
Further complicating the issue of oversight is the existence of
satellite repair stations. While the certified main repair station
may be domiciled in one country, it may have satellite repair
stations located inside or outside of its geographic bounda-
ries.136 For example, if an Airbus A380 aircraft operated by
American Airlines from Honolulu has a maintenance issue
which grounds the aircraft in Singapore, American Airlines may
send it to a contract repair facility in Singapore. That Singapore-
132 Vision 100, supra note 96.
133 2009 Foreign Repair Station Update, supra note 124.
134 2003 DOT IG Report, supra note 130, at ii.
135 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY ON COOPERATION IN THE REGULATION OF CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY (June
30, 2011), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169475.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7C53-9SJA].
136 8900.1, supra note 121, § 2-1245.
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based facility may be either carrier-certified, FAA-certified or
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)-certified. Even if it is
an FAA-certified repair station, some work may be shipped to a
non-FAA certified satellite repair station which has excess capac-
ity in Singapore, or to an Airbus-certified OEM maintenance fa-
cility in a French territory such as Reunion.
As repair station personnel may be interchanged with other
personnel anywhere in a repair station’s (or a carrier’s) satellite
network, it is possible for qualified and unqualified personnel
from different facilities to work on or have access to an aircraft,
engine, or component undergoing maintenance at a foreign re-
pair station and to have access to technical and operational in-
formation. From a chain of custody or inspection oversight
perspective this can be problematic. Additionally, it is very risky
from a security perspective. Because carriers pool parts and
equipment, it is possible that an aircraft with four engines could
have four different repair facilities work on the engines regis-
tered to the aircraft (none of which may actually be installed on
the aircraft) and any engines in the maintenance pool (any of
which may be actually installed on the airframe) while another
facility works on the airframe and other facilities perform work
on components or spares. Pooling and personnel interchange
arrangements, while cost effective for carriers, complicate secur-
ity and introduce multiple points at which an insider may sabo-
tage an aircraft or gain access to sensitive information which can
be exploited for altruistic or nefarious purposes. For example, a
pooled engine that had been sabotaged by a mechanic could be
installed at random on an appropriate airframe.
In 2009, the TSA issued a notice of a proposed rule which
would “codify the scope of TSA’s existing inspection program
and . . . require regulated parties to allow TSA and [DHS] offi-
cials to enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, and records
relevant to repair stations.”137 Further, the rule would “provide
procedures for TSA to notify repair stations of any deficiencies
in their security programs, and to determine whether a particu-
lar repair station presents an immediate risk to security.”138
While the draft rule would require FAA-certified repair stations
to implement a TSA-devised security program to mitigate the
risk of being targeted for terrorist activity, the program would
allow for variation in security measures for “those repair stations
137 49 C.F.R. §§ 1520, 1554 (2009), at 59874.
138 Id.
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with a lower risk profile, such as those repair stations not situ-
ated on or adjacent to an airport or those repair stations located
on airports that only serve aircraft with a maximum certified
takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or less.”139
Despite the need for consistency in application and rigorous
oversight, the proposed rule creates two significant areas that
are vulnerable to exploitation. First, the TSA will consider a re-
pair station to be in compliance if it is already incorporated
within an airport’s security program and uses the airport’s ac-
cess control measures.140 Second, repair stations located at facili-
ties for which the United States has security responsibilities
(e.g., military air fields, government maintenance depots, etc.)
would not be required to comply with this rule as such facilities
presumptively meet or exceed TSA’s proposed security require-
ments.141 The proposed rule relies on voluntary compliance and
cooperation of industry. It also relies on the aviation industry’s
willingness to absorb the cost of implementing an unfunded
mandate. Assuming industry would be willing to absorb attend-
ant implementation costs, the proposed rule fails to provide
standard procedures, training, oversight, and inspection criteria
to foreign repair stations.
VI. AIRCRAFT TRUSTS
While foreign repair stations present tangible opportunities
for insider exploitation, disruption, and sabotage, aircraft trusts
present more subtle opportunities due to their structure, legal
legitimacy, and long-standing global use by banks, financial insti-
tutions, and manufacturers. As the promotion of commerce and
safety are statutory components of U.S. aviation policy, it is not
139 TSA Aircraft Repair Station Security Proposed Rulemaking, NAT’L BUS. AVIATION
ASSOC. (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.nbaa.org/ops/security/programs/repair-sta
tion/ [https://perma.cc/C79J-DDXH].
140 Key proposed requirements include descriptions of measures used to iden-
tify individuals who are authorized to enter the repair station; measures used to
control access and to detect and prevent the entry of unauthorized individuals
and vehicles into or within the repair station; measures used to control access to
the aircraft and/or aircraft components; measures used to escort and verify any
individual’s right to enter the facility; training of TSA’s security requirements for
all individuals with authorized access to aircraft and components; measures used
to verify employee background information; the name, 24-hour contact informa-
tion, duties, and training requirements of a designated security coordinator; a
contingency plan; a diagram detailing boundaries and pertinent physical features
of the repair station; a list and description of all entry points; and an emergency
response contact list. See id.
141 Id.
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surprising that the provisions of 49 U.S.C. §§ 44102 and 44103
encourage and legitimize foreign ownership and U.S.
registration.142
A. TRUST STRUCTURES
For many aircraft purchasers, aircraft finance involves lever-
aged leasing143 and trust arrangements. While aircraft trust ar-
rangements with U.S. financial institutions and banks are a
legitimate and useful tool in promoting sales of U.S.-manufac-
tured aircraft and promoting aviation safety, their widespread
use and minimal due diligence requirements make them vulner-
able to exploitation by criminal and terrorist front organizations
for various purposes including money laundering and gaining
apparently lawful access to U.S. airspace. This cloak of legiti-
macy makes it possible to introduce people and hazardous or
illegal cargo into the continental United States and U.S. territo-
ries and possessions.
FAA regulations and trusts intersect when someone seeks to
register an aircraft. While an aircraft’s owner can apply for regis-
tration on the N Registry,144 an aircraft is eligible for registration
on the N Registry only if it is owned by a U.S. citizen.145 Al-
though the U.S. citizenship requirement presents an issue for
foreign owners who wish to register and operate their aircraft in
the United States, a simple solution is to form a U.S. company.
As companies are legal “persons,” the company can be the
owner-applicant.146 A U.S. citizen or resident alien must be a
corporate officer with at least seventy-five percent of the voting
power, as non-citizens are capped at a maximum twenty-five per-
cent ownership interest; the company’s president and at least
142 49 U.S.C. § 44102 (2012) (Registration requirements); 49 U.S.C. § 44103
(2012) (Registration of aircraft).
143 A leveraged lease of an aircraft involves a minimum of a lessee, a lessor, and
a long-term creditor. The typical aircraft lessees are airlines, charter operators,
and corporations. Institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies, and
pension plan funds provide the leverage and multiple lenders may be involved in
financing a single aircraft transaction. See Deborah Brady & Paul Ingram, A Lever-
aged Lease Primer—Understanding the Tax and Accounting Treatments of this Powerful
Equipment Finance Tool, EQUIP. LEASING AND FIN. ASS’N (May 2006), http://www.
elfaonline.org/cvweb_elfa/Product_Downloads/E06MAYBRADY.PDF [https://
perma.cc/Y3T7-35XF].
144 49 U.S.C. § 44103(a) (2012).
145 49 U.S.C. § 44102(a)(1)(A) (2012).
146 Corporations: An Overview, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.
law.cornell.edu/wex/corporations (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
WSN9-4JKM].
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sixty-seven percent of the company’s directors must be U.S. citi-
zens or resident aliens.147
By forming a Delaware limited liability company (LLC), the
LLC can enter into a trust arrangement with a bank acting as
owner-trustee. The LLC-trust arrangement is a well-established
legal way for foreign and domestic purchasers of new or used
aircraft to effect U.S. registration and operate their aircraft in
U.S. airspace. This arrangement facilitates sales of U.S.-manufac-
tured aircraft globally, as well as generating higher resale prices
of U.S.-registered aircraft which are perceived as safer to operate
and better maintained because of FAA oversight. FAA oversight
of N-registered aircraft in turn promotes aviation safety as FAA
airworthiness standards are more comprehensive and better en-
forced than those of many other national registries. As the cost
of registration is only $5.00148 instead of a percentage of the air-
craft’s value or purchase price, U.S. registration is a bargain.
The N Registry provides reliable, efficient, and free access to air-
craft and engine title information. In addition, U.S. registered
aircraft have the benefit of U.S. legal protections.
B. VULNERABILITIES
Because the N Registry does not pierce the corporate veil, for-
eign owners routinely form LLCs as part of overall trust arrange-
ments. This legitimate practice poses potential problems, as a
hostile individual could use a U.S.-registered aircraft to engage
in a variety of lawful and unlawful activities within the United
States. By purchasing a U.S.-registered aircraft, apart from being
a means for laundering large sums of money, the aircraft could
be used to ferry hostile agents to and from the continental
United States, U.S. territories, or countries which grant U.S.-reg-
istered aircraft landing rights once re-registered with FAA. In
essence, the aircraft itself becomes the “insider” as it is the
means of introducing hostile persons (i.e., owners, passengers,
crew) and means (i.e., cargo) into the United States or function-
ing as a weapon (i.e., crashing into ground/airborne targets; re-
leasing chemical dispersants above cities, watersheds, or crops;
147 14 C.F.R. § 47.2(3) (2015).
148 Aircraft Registry, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/licenses_certif
icates/aircraft_certification/aircraft_registry/register_aircraft/ (last visited Sept.
1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8R7F-DSBM].
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inducing terror by detonating above a crowd, etc.). In effect,
Pegasus149 can turn into a Trojan horse.150
Although the USA PATRIOT Act151 targets money laundering,
it can be used to combat the insider threat posed by opaque
trust arrangements. Banks which act as trustees must complete
due diligence on all trust beneficial owners, guarantors, equip-
ment lessors, and escrow depositors and recipients for any new
trust transaction.152 However, existing trusts are grandfathered.
There are also exemptions to the due diligence requirement.
For example, lenders and government agencies or offices are
exempt, as are all USA PATRIOT Act-defined financial institu-
tions and their subsidiaries.153 Lessees are also exempt unless
the bank processes payments from them or holds deposits on
their behalf.154
Exemptions aside, due diligence must be performed on the
actual signing party, whether it is a special purpose entity (SPE),
corporation, LLC, or partnership. This means a bank must have
copies of the articles of incorporation or other official docu-
mentation of the existence of any party establishing a trust as a
beneficial interest holder.155 For publicly traded entities, a tax or
employer identification number or access to publicly available
financial reporting information156 is required. If the actual sign-
ing entity is a parent corporation’s wholly- or partially-owned
subsidiary, affiliate or joint venture, due diligence must be per-
formed on that entity instead of the parent. For countries identi-
fied by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes
149 Micha F. Lindemans, Pegasus, ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA (2001), http://www.
pantheon.org/articles/p/pegasus.html [https://perma.cc/KWE3-EQ2V].
150 Micha F. Lindemans, Trojan Horse, ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA (1999), http://
www.pantheon.org/articles/t/trojan_horse.html [https://perma.cc/KJ8N-
5GEJ].
151 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56 115 Stat. 272, (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
152 U.S. financial institutions are prohibited from establishing, maintaining,
administrating, or managing correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks. See
id. § 313.
153 31 C.F.R. § 1010.205 (2012) (defined in 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(t) (2014)).
154 Id. § 1010.315, 330.
155 U.S. financial institutions furnishing correspondent accounts to foreign
banks must maintain records of the owners of the foreign bank and the name
and address of the foreign bank’s U.S. agent. See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note
151, § 319(b); see also 14 C.F.R. § 47.8 (2010).
156 Publicly available information may include audited annual reports, periodic
reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, call reports,
stock exchange listing information, etc. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 47.7–.8.
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Enforcement Network (FinCEN), due diligence extends beyond
the SPE level to include individual principals or controlling of-
ficers of the SPE, or to the corporate owner of the SPE. For non-
FinCEN countries, due diligence stops at the initial SPE level.157
While due diligence is designed to tighten up banking loop-
holes and prevent money laundering, there is no similar na-
tional requirement imposed on company formation. Forming a
company to facilitate purchasing aircraft is simple and can be
done online on an expedited basis in as little as one hour with
credit card payment.158 Once the company is formed, the next
step is trust formation. Aviation trusts typically take several
weeks to structure. Once the trust aircraft is registered, the
trust’s owner-trustee is identified on the registry instead of the
actual owner.159 It is difficult to penetrate trust walls to identify
an individual. The aircraft’s owner of record is more likely to be
a corporation than an individual. The citizenship requirement
for registration does not impede trust formation or aircraft re-
gistration, but rather encourages the use of opaque legal struc-
tures such as trusts which make it harder to identify individuals.
Assuming it were possible to identify the corporate owner of
an aircraft, that entity could be an affiliate, subsidiary, or joint
venture of a parent company. Typically, the names of the presi-
dent, directors, or shareholders having five percent or more
beneficial ownership interest in the company are not listed on
the N Registry160 or in the trust instruments.161 In addition,
157 Individual beneficial interest holders must provide identification in the
form of a U.S. Social Security number (SSN) or taxpayer identification number
(TIN) accompanied by a date of birth. For individual beneficial interest holders
who do not have an SSN or TIN, individual citizens of FinCEN countries, and
individual owners or controlling officers of FinCEN-based SPEs, a legible copy of
a passport or other government-issued ID, including country of issuance, type of
document, ID number, dates of issuance and expiry, and an identifying photo-
graph must be provided. In addition, all trust beneficial interest holders, lessors,
and lessees must provide contact information, including contact name, address,
telephone number, and, if available, fax number and email address. See 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5311-5314e (2012).
158 Expedited Services, STATE OF DEL., DIV. OF CORPS., http://corp.delaware.gov/
expserv.shtml (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/L2SD-B2TC].
159 N-Number Inquiry Results: N100FF, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://registry.faa.
gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=100FF (last visited Sept. 1,
2017) [https://perma.cc/734H-4GW3].
160 N-Number Inquiry Results: N68789, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://registry.
faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=68789 (last visited
Sept. 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/BRX8-UYRC].
161 See Notice of Proposed Policy Clarification for the Registration of Aircraft to U.S.
Citizen Trustees in Situations Involving Non-U.S. Citizen Trustors and Beneficiaries, FED.
2017] THE INSIDER THREAT 551
these individuals are not necessarily signatories to the trust doc-
uments or the sole users of the aircraft. Even if those individuals
were identified on the registry, listing their names does not
make an aircraft, airline, or the national airspace any safer from
insider activities. If anything, listing individual owners or corpo-
rate officers and directors online may make them (and/or their
families) targets of identity theft, kidnapping, fraud, or other
crimes. Furthermore, identifying such individuals does not nec-
essarily correspond to who an insider may be. It is possible a
friend, business acquaintance, employee, contractor, or family
member could be the insider who takes advantage of the oppor-
tunity presented by his association with the aircraft’s owner. It is
also possible an insider could be a banker, lawyer, aircraft bro-
ker, aircraft safety inspector, or any other person involved in the
purchase, trust formation, or registration process. There is no
reliable way to predict the likelihood that a person who is a U.S.
citizen, resident alien, or foreign national would use an aircraft
trust or registration to do something harmful inside the United
States, to its people, or to its interests.
Viewing trust vulnerabilities from the perspective of legal and
financial access, a banker or an attorney could be pressured to
access client information for purposes contrary to their duties as
fiduciaries. They could also manipulate trust and registration
documents for purposes of aiding and abetting criminal or ter-
rorist activities. Insiders who are bankers or lawyers could use
their insider status either against or for a trust beneficiary’s in-
terests as they are in the position of drafting the legal instru-
ments, gathering information, and obtaining executed signature
pages necessary to complete trust formation and to effect regis-
tration. For example, a banker could furnish a scanned copy of
a valid signature to a third party who could then use it to obtain
false identification documents or to authorize fund transfers for
a parallel transaction for an alter ego entity which could then be
used to acquire an aircraft in order to subsequently smuggle
weapons, transport terrorist cell members, or be loaded with
enough ammonium nitrate-fuel oil to level a building.
With over 357,000 aircraft registered on the N Registry as of
July 20, 2010,162 there are numerous opportunities to exploit the
AVIATION ADMIN. (2011), https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_
offices/agc/special/aircraft_registration_proposed_policy_clarification/media/
Federal%20Register%20Notice%202.9.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY8U-X8SA].
162 Re-Registration and Renewal of Aircraft Registration, 14 C.F.R. pts. 13, 47,
91 (2010), at 41977.
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three-year re-registration requirement established in July
2010.163 For a variety of reasons including lack of awareness,
changes of mailing address and sales of registered aircraft, ap-
proximately 100,000 aircraft registered before October 1, 2010,
are expected to not renew their registrations. Due to the time
and expense entailed in terminating and revoking registrations
and the institutional reluctance to terminate the registration of
someone who may have moved and simply failed to update his
contact information on file with the N Registry, the FAA pub-
lishes an expired and pending cancellation report.164 An enter-
prising individual could take advantage of that published
information to “renew” a lapsed registration and then use that
registration number on a similar make and model aircraft, thus
cloaking it with legitimacy and enabling it to fly to, from, or
within U.S. airspace.
VII. POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS AND SOLUTIONS
While the insider threat has always existed, how it is addressed
is important as it not only affects national security, but serves as
a reflection of our societal values. Three areas which raise po-
tential problems for repair stations and trusts include insider
threat countermeasures, private sector contracts, and growing
complacency.
A. INSIDER THREAT COUNTERMEASURES
While the FAA is not an intelligence agency per se, it provides
vital aviation intelligence165 and aviation-related information to
DHS and other intelligence community members while also
functioning as a liaison to the aviation community. Balancing
statutory and constitutional rights with countermeasures against
perceived insider threats raises the ante, particularly as applied
to whistleblowers, due process, and employee privacy.
163 Id. at 41968.
164 See Expired/Pending Aircraft Registration Cancellation Results, FED. AVIATION AD-
MIN., http://registry.faa.gov/AircraftRenewal_reports/PendingCancel_Inquiry
.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/S58H-GQEP].
165 The FAA has an Office of Intelligence, which is a consumer of raw and
finished information from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Its twenty-
four-hour watch operation is also responsible for fusion analysis and reporting.
See Statement of Claudio Manno to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES (Jan. 27, 2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing7/
witness_manno.htm [https://perma.cc/6DD3-6VM8].
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While the FAA has a legitimate interest in safeguarding classi-
fied information, controlling access to FAA facilities, ensuring
safe operations within U.S. sovereign airspace, and adherence to
FAA requirements by repair stations, it must also exercise sound
discretion and independent judgment within legal limits. For
example, if in the course of routine monitoring or inspections
an FAA employee determines that another employee or a con-
tractor has been accessing sensitive or classified information
outside the scope of his normal duties (or reporting or leaking
information which was accessible because of his normal duties),
the natural reaction would be to plug the leak by suspending,
firing, detaining, or arresting the individual. However, as federal
employee jobs are considered property,166 the employee cannot
be arbitrarily suspended, fired, demoted, or removed from his
position. He is entitled to procedural due process as “[n]o per-
son shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”167 Specifically, the employee is entitled to notice
of the proposed action and a meaningful opportunity to re-
spond.168 If the employee is a bargaining unit employee, that
compounds the problem because federal employee labor un-
ions such as the National Air Traffic Controllers’ Association
have contractual rights to be informed of management actions
and to represent their interests and as well as those of their
members.169 If the employee is not afforded due process and
properly handled, the FAA could be ordered to reinstate him
and exercise proper due process measures if it wishes to termi-
nate him lawfully.
To prevent future leaks, understanding the employee’s ratio-
nale is important. If that employee leaked information about a
recurrent failure of an avionics component (or an inspector
whitewashing safety records or security lapses of a repair station)
out of frustration because his efforts to report the problems up
the chain of command were ignored (or he was labeled a trou-
blemaker and blacklisted after doing so), that may explain why
he published his claims on a blog, Twitter, or in the media. If
the FAA sought adverse action against him after he published
166 Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993).
167 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
168 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542–45 (1985).
169 Laura Brown & Doug Church, FAA and NATCA Reach Landmark Labor Agree-
ment, NAT’L AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS’ ASSOC. (Aug. 13, 2009), http://
www.aviationpros.com/press_release/10398368/faa-and-natca-reach-landmark-
labor-agreement [https://perma.cc/3S45-HJ5B].
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his allegations, he could potentially invoke whistleblower protec-
tion.170 In addition to media scrutiny, congressional inquiry, and
a DOT Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation, the
FAA could also face unfair labor practice claims, arbitration with
federal employee labor unions, and third party lawsuits. The
cost and resources dedicated to defending the agency and oust-
ing the insider are a distraction, which diverts resources from
the FAA’s mission and erodes morale.
Countermeasures, such as computer monitoring or close su-
pervision and scrutiny of an employee’s or a contractor’s activi-
ties, can also backfire due to overzealous enforcement,
prejudice, or ignorance. For example, an overzealous inspector
(or security employee or IT manager) could single out employ-
ees and contractors at repair stations and the N Registry for
computer monitoring or closer scrutiny and supervision because
of their perceived ethnicity (or recent overseas travel, access to
sensitive information, personal animus, or other reasons). With-
out probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing,
that inspector (or security employee or IT manager) who acts
on his gut instincts (or who overreacts to threat reports) could
trigger equal protection,171 First Amendment,172 and privacy173
claims against the FAA. In addition to the attendant embarrass-
ment, stress, and negative impact on morale and the mission
that the parade of horribles would have on the agency, the FAA
could potentially lose some or all or its statutory independence
from DOT174 or have its funding slashed by Congress.
To prevent arbitrary actions and overzealous enforcement,
the FAA could take several cost-effective steps which would im-
prove insider threat awareness and minimize the risk of scandal
and expense of legal action. The FAA could conduct annual in-
person and/or online whistleblower training for current manag-
170 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2012).
171 As the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states, federal government
actions that discriminate against protected classes of individuals implicate Fifth
Amendment due process rights. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.
172 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
173 Order 1280.1B, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information (PII), FED. AVIA-
TION ADMIN. (Dec. 17, 2008), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Or
der/1280.1B_.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V5W-P4AA]; see also U.S. CONST. amends.
IX, XIV, § 1; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
174 See H.R. REP. No. 104-848, at 105 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“Section 623 amends
section 106 of title 49, United States Code, to provide the FAA Administrator
express autonomy and authority with regard to the internal functioning of the
agency.”).
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ers and employees. This training would be provided to new hires
as part of the onboarding process, while first-time managers
would be required to complete training within thirty days of pro-
motion. It could also use annual FAA employee survey feedback
to improve whistleblower and fraud hotline reporting systems
and ensure employees view them as a responsible and respon-
sive mechanism for reporting their concerns confidentially
within FAA channels. In addition, FAA managers and employees
should receive annual insider threat training utilizing case stud-
ies and best practices of other agencies and private industry so
that they understand what constitutes an insider and the evolv-
ing nature of the threat.
As for certified repair facilities, they should be required to
provide proof of annual employee insider threat training (e.g.,
course sign-in or training logs) and current security procedures
as a condition of certification. To minimize labor issues related
to employee discipline, the FAA should work with federal em-
ployee labor unions to develop expedited review procedures for
alleged insider actions and a table of appropriate penalties. To
ensure widespread awareness of the insider threat, the FAA
could use its employee website to publish periodic articles on
insider threats and countermeasures.
Complementing employee threat awareness measures, man-
agers should be encouraged to address and elevate employee
concerns, tips, and questions regarding possible safety and se-
curity issues. Furthermore, employees and managers should be
educated on their right to seek counsel from the FAA Office of
General Counsel (OGC) and be encouraged to seek OGC gui-
dance before undertaking actions affecting employees and con-
tractors in order to ensure that the prospective actions and
means to accomplish them comply with agency guidelines and
U.S. law. If EO 13587 and NSD 42 were harmonized, the FAA
would be named an ITTF permanent member agency and serve
in similar capacity as it does on the steering committee estab-
lished by NSD 42. Finally, the FAA should coordinate with Trea-
sury, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and DHS
regarding banking and financial regulations which affect trans-
parency of aircraft trusts.
B. PRIVATE SECTOR CONTRACTS
Apart from the risk posed by insider activities at repair sta-
tions and trust companies, there are collateral opportunities to
exploit their vulnerabilities. For example, the FAA contracts
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with numerous companies to provide services and products to
support operations, including maintaining the N Registry
records database and repair station certification records and in-
spection reports. It is likely a portion of the FAA’s 2014 budget
of approximately $15.6 billion175 will be spent on contracts for
goods and services related to repair stations and the N Registry,
including a portion of the $77 million budgeted for technical
support.176 It is possible that a contractor supporting either op-
eration could engage in overzealous conduct in a well-meaning
attempt to further FAA efforts to combat insider threats.
It is also possible that if the FAA utilizes “enterprise insider
threat software package”177 spyware such as that solicited by TSA
to enable it to combat insider threats by monitoring “the emails,
chat, web browser history, and even the keystrokes of its employ-
ees”178 and contractors, that a contractor could use his skills and
access to gather competitive business intelligence or to thwart
enforcement efforts.
Another possibility is such spyware could have backdoor ports
which would enable the FAA, or another agency such as the
NSA, to monitor and exploit repair station and bank internal
correspondence and databases. If FAA contractors were to use
spyware to hack into bank or repair station systems in an effort
to combat perceived insider threats, it could give rise to claims
for breach of contract and violations of foreign data privacy laws
as well as espionage if the foreign repair station were owned by a
state-owned company. If discovered, such data mining would
create a global scandal and severely damage U.S. foreign
relations.
Apart from the constitutional issues posed by electronic
snooping highlighted by the unfolding NSA data collection
scandal,179 and the yet-to-be-determined extent of contractor in-
volvement, all government agencies use contractors to perform
175 Budget Highlights, Fiscal Year 2014, DEP’T. OF TRANSP., at 9 (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/
FY%202014%20Budget%20Highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ5B-D6NY].
176 Id. at 13.
177 Steve Watson, Congress Presses TSA To Crack Down on “Insider Threats” from Its




179 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, The NSA’s Problem? Too Much Data: NSA
Collects Millions of Email Address Books Globally, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-
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functions which are not inherently governmental. The line be-
tween what is an inherent governmental function180 and func-
tions “closely associated”181 with inherent governmental
functions can blur when it comes to technical and intelligence
contracts.
While the FAA employs contractors to assist with myriad tasks,
faced with shrinking budgets and time pressures, there is a ten-
dency for work to be delegated to contractors which may cross
the line into inherently governmental functions. There is also
the potential for conflicts of interest to arise by virtue of access
and opportunity, whether through use of spyware or by virtue of
job function. Contractors may gain access to proprietary data,
information, and technologies of rival companies as well as FAA
assessments of capabilities which could give these insiders a
competitive advantage in upcoming contract solicitations.
To prevent overreaching, mission creep, and delegations
which violate federal law and agency regulations, the FAA’s in-
ternal oversight and inspection programs must be robust, visi-
ble, and regularly updated. In addition, functions currently
performed by contractors which were previously performed by
federal employees (or which could be readily assumed by fed-
eral employees) should be performed in-house by federal em-
ployees to the maximum extent feasible. To further minimize
insider threat risks posed by contractors, a robust acquisition in-
tegrity program such as the Department of the Navy’s182 should
be integrated within FAA’s OGC. Because contractors are not
federal employees, FAA employees and managers need to un-
derstand the limitations on information which can be shared
with contractors as well as activities which can be performed by
them. To do so, annual training should be implemented agency-
mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8
f_story.html?utm_term=.2da9088f4ac0 [http://perma.cc/5A3T-WKJS].
180 Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112
Stat. 2382, Sect. 5(2) (Oct. 19, 1998); see also Policy Letter 11-01, Performance of
Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, OFF. OF FED. PROCUREMENT POL’Y,
OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2011-09-12/pdf/2011-23165.pdf [https://perma.cc/V58W-GSLM].
181 Jacob B. Pankowski, New Definition of “Inherently Governmental Function” Af-
fects Government Insourcing Decisions, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 24, 2011), http://
www.natlawreview.com/article/new-definition-inherently-governmental-function-
affects-government-insourcing-decisions [https://perma.cc/MD3P-A26B].
182 Acquisition Integrity Office, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL,
http://www.secnav.navy.mil/OGC/AIO/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 1,
2017) [https://perma.cc/4FC4-DSD3].
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wide for all managers. Furthermore, in each notice of solicita-
tion and contract award over the $150,000 simplified acquisition
threshold,183 a contract requirement should be included which
requires contractors to certify that their employees received
training (at no expense to the government) on conflicts of inter-
est, inherent governmental functions, and insider threats.
C. COMPLACENCY
Arguably, complacency is the biggest problem any agency
faces when combating a known threat. After an attack, security
violation, or OIG inspection, employees and managers have a
heightened sense of vigilance. However, the “sense of vigilance
for and priority attached to tight security can dissipate with the
passage of time from a terrorist event; this, in turn, may lead to a
sense of complacency as well as pressures to relax security.”184
To prevent the insider threat from becoming stale, it is impor-
tant to keep employees and contractors informed of successes
and failures of other agencies, private industries, and the FAA.
One way to do so is to recognize the contributions of alert em-
ployees and contractors who act lawfully and use the proper
channels to report activities which safeguard FAA resources and
the flying public. Even if names of individuals must be withheld
or some information redacted for privacy, national security, or
legal reasons, summaries of successes and failures should be
published on the FAA employee website. A series of well-told
stories and articles highlighting different kinds of insider activi-
ties can do more to combat complacency and educate employ-
ees and contractors than countless memoranda, posters, and
notices on proper and improper ways to correct problems and
ensure integrity FAA-wide. Threat awareness must remain fresh
and catch the imagination of the audience.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Foreign repair stations and aircraft trusts serve valuable legiti-
mate commercial and operational purposes. While safety and se-
curity are different issues, they are related. The insider threat
should be addressed rationally, consistently, and comprehen-
sively. As the NITP is not a single policy, where there are dis-
crepancies, such as between EO 13587 and NSD 42, they should
183 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2017).
184 DOT IG Statement, supra note 57, at 5.
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be harmonized. How the insider threat is addressed is important
given the FAA’s high level of public trust and visibility.
As the FAA is a civil, military, and economic target, national
aviation security policy must involve the FAA. At a minimum, the
FAA should be part of the ITTF, particularly since commercial
aviation was and will remain a target of terrorists. International
cooperation is crucial to combat threats and vulnerabilities of
foreign repair stations as well as aircraft trusts. Domestic cooper-
ation is vital; therefore, the TSA cannot unilaterally fail to issue
rules relating to foreign repair stations, but must work with the
FAA instead of against it. The FAA and the TSA share security
interests which affect aviation safety and should act in concert to
address security issues relating to foreign repair stations. Simi-
larly, DHS must work collaboratively with the FAA on aircraft
trusts to look beyond money-laundering to prevent wolves from
wearing sheep’s clothing.
Foreign repair station certification is in the national interest,
not just because of its impact on aviation safety and its impor-
tance to our economy, but because it is a global aviation security
issue. Aircraft trusts are also in the national interest as they serve
legitimate commercial purposes and promote sales of U.S. air-
craft. However, the USA PATRIOT Act can be used to combat
the insider threat if due diligence loopholes are plugged.
The areas which raise potential problems for foreign repair
stations and aviation trusts are threat countermeasures, private
sector contracts, and complacency. Countermeasures must be
judiciously applied using discretion and independent judgment.
They cannot be arbitrary and must address the root cause, par-
ticularly with respect to employee leaks. They cannot be over-
zealous hip shots or they will backfire with far-reaching
consequences. Private sector contracts can create potential is-
sues as contractors may act overzealously to counter perceived
threats and the tools employed may be used inappropriately.
Apart from being a source of potential insider activity, use of
contractors could result in mission creep. The most insidious
problem is complacency as it is human nature to relax one’s
guard over time, thus creating new opportunities for insiders. By
exercising sound judgment and educating its employees, man-
agers, and contractors, the FAA can maintain aviation safety and
security without jeopardizing its culture or undertaking draco-
nian measures.
While the insider threat cannot be completely eradicated, the
FAA can limit the opportunities of insiders to exploit foreign
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repair stations and aviation trusts. The policy and statutory
framework of executive orders, national security directives, and
IRTPA shape the FAA’s ability to combat insider threats. By un-
derstanding the history and structure of repair stations and
trusts, the FAA can develop effective countermeasures. The
openness which is part of FAA and aviation culture is a strength
which can be leveraged to combat the insider threat through
recognition and publication of successes and failures in addition
to regular training and access to counsel.
